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THE RAPE SYSTEM: OLD ROLES AND NEW
TIMES
Sally Gold and Martha Wyatt*
I. INTRODUCTION
A rape victim who chooses to report the attack upon her to the authori-
ties endures particular embarrassment and shame. The progress of her case
through our criminal justice system has been compared to a second rape;
the victim is made to feel that she, rather than the attacker, is on trial. If
her assailant is adjudged not guilty, she must also endure damage to her
reputation. What is most unfortunate, however, is that the shameful treat-
ment she receives is a direct result of our society's rape laws, which are not
designed to protect her, but rather the male possessory interest in her.
Two elements are involved in the crime of rape: the penetration with
force by the attacker and the lack of consent of the attacked. Each element
is separate and distinct; one does not necessarily constitute evidence of the
other. A rape victim, therefore, must prove her own innocence as to the
requisite lack of consent. In reality, she becomes a co-defendant charged
with the crime of consent. If she is not acquitted-if the jury cannot deter-
mine beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was non-consensual-she
has, in fact, if not in law, been deprived of a legally cognizable inter-
est-her reputation. Moreover, the woman is treated like any other crimi-
nal defendant, but without many of the substantive and procedural
protections such defendants are usually accorded.
In support of this thesis, this article will examine the history of rape
laws, from the Code of Hammurabi to present, and will discuss the system-
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atic treatment which today's rape victim is forced to endure. Proceeding
from the assumption that the rape victim possesses a dual status as witness
and defendant, several proposed modifications to our criminal justice sys-
tem will be advanced. This article will not discuss the body of evidentiary
rules which relate to the issue of non-consent, nor will it address such top-
ics as the courtroom admissibility of the rape victim's previous sexual ex-
perience, her prior unchastity, or her moral characteristics. The concerns
of this article are more fundamental. By viewing the victim as a defendant
and by focusing upon her status as such, it then becomes possible to con-
ceive of a whole panoply of necessary and viable reforms to our criminal
justice system. In essence, if society is to continue to treat its rape victims
as defendants, fairness and due process demand that these victims be ac-
corded the same protections which society accords all other defendants.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: OLD ROLES
The first rape law appeared in Babylon, 1900 B.C., in the Code of Ham-
murabi.' It provides that if a man should force the "betrothed wife" of
another to have sexual intercourse with him, he shall be put to death and
the woman shall go free. "If a man force the betrothed wife of another who
has not known a male and is living in her father's house and he lie in her
bosom and they take him, that man shall be put to death and that woman
shallgofree.'' 2 This last phrase "shall go free" is indeed a curious one, for
nowhere else in the Code is the fate of the victim of an offense prescribed.
Moreover, this phrase appears in three other sections of the Code, and in
each case it is used to prescribe the treatment to be accorded a person who
held something in trust for someone else and who, ostensibly, breached
that trust.
The first time the phrase "shall go free" is mentioned, it relates to the
escape of a fugitive slave from the possession of a "captor." "If the slave
escape from the hand of his captor, that man shall so declare,3 in the name
1. The Code of Hammurabi was an extensive code of civil and criminal laws which
were said to have been given to King Hammurabi (who was King Amraphel, the sixth king
of the Semitic Dynasty (1945-1902 B.C.)) by the Sun God. These laws were subsequently
published throughout the Mesopotamian world. See THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS
403-04 (J. Hertz ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS]. But see
L. CO1'rRELL, THE QUEST FOR SUMER 149 (1965), which dates the reign of Hammurabi
from the years 1728 to 1686 B.C.
2. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON § 130 (2d ed. R. Harper 1904) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
3. Statements made by a party or witness were made in court, generally under oath.
See S. KRAMER, THE SUMERIANS, THEIR HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHARACTER 87 (1963).
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of god, to the owner of the slave and shall go free."'4 Since assisting a slave
to escape was punishable by death, 5 it appears that there exists a presump-
tion that the escape of the slave was somehow aided by the "captor." Al-
though the presumption could be overcome by the captor's declaration
under oath that he was not responsible for the escape, by having to prove
his innocence in order to go free, the captor is, nevertheless, initially
treated as a defendant in this situation.
The phrase next appears in a provision applicable to the robbery of
goods belonging to a merchant while in the possession of a bailee. "If
when [the bailee] goes on a journey, an enemy rob him of whatever he was
carrying, the agent shall take an oath in the name of god and go free."6 As
in the case of the captor, there is an initial presumption that the bailee was
responsible for the loss, for the bailee must swear to the truth of the rob-
bery in order to "go free." Finally, the phrase appears in a section dealing
with the loss of an ox belonging to another. "If a man hire an ox and a god
strike it and it die, the man who hired the ox shall take an oath before god
and go free."'7 Again, the person entrusted with someone else's property
must overcome a presumption that he had breached the owner's trust.
An analysis of the three provisions in which the phrase "shall go free"
appears indicates that in each case the victim of the crime is the owner of
the goods. Similarly, in each case, the person to whom the goods were
entrusted is initially suspected of the crime. By parity of reasoning, it be-
comes clear that for the crime of rape, the victim of the rape is the be-
trothed husband-the legitimate possessor of the woman. 8 The status of
the raped woman is much like that of the bailee; she held something in
trust for her husband-herself-and she is presumed to have breached this
trust. She is considered a defendant rather than a victim.
Moreover, should a woman consent to the illicit intercourse, another
section of the code provides that she shall be put to death. "If the wife of a
man be taken in lying with another man, they shall bind them and throw
them into the water. If the husband of the woman would save his wife, or
if the king would save his male servant (he may)." 9 In this case, the woman
is an accomplice. Her crime is consent; both she and her paramour are
4. See CODE, supra note 2, at § 20. The phrase "that man" in the statute refers to the
captor-the one who captured the runaway slave.
5. Id. at § 15.
6. Id. at § 103.
7. Id. at § 249.
8. For further support of this contention see, e.g., CODE, supra note 2, at § 117 (a man
who is in debt may sell his wife, son, or daughter to help pay his debt), §§ 209-10 (one who
strikes and kills another's daughter shall have his own daughter put to death).
9. See COpE, supra note 2, at § 129. The inference of parallel relationships between
husband-wife and king-servant is also noteworthy.
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guilty of a trespass upon the property of her husband. Only if she can show
that what she held in trust for another was taken from her without her
consent, can she, like the merchant's bailee, "go free."
Approximately one thousand years after the Code of Hammurabi, a set
of laws relating to rape and adultery appeared in Deuteronomy as part of
the Laws of Moses.m0 The first of these laws provides:
If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a
man find her in the city, and lie with her; [t]hen ye shall bring
them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them
with stones that they die; the damsel, because she cried not, being
in the city; and the man because he hath humbled his neighbour's
wife: so thou shalt put away evil among you. But if a man find a
betrothed damsel in the field, and the man force her, and lie with
her: then the man only that lay with her shall die: But unto the
damsel thou shalt do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin wor-
thy of death; for as when a man riseth against his neighbour, and
slayeth him, even so in this matter; [flor he found her in the field,
and the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none to save her. "
If the woman is taken by force in the field, she, like the woman of Baby-
lon, goes free. She is given the benefit of the doubt' 2 due to the difficulty
of proving her resistance "in the field." If, however, she is raped in the city,
she has the burden of proving her innocence. A strong presumption of
guilt exists which only her act of crying out and being heard can rebut.
The laws in Deuteronomy also address adultery: "If a man be found
lying with a woman married to an husband, then they shall both of them
die, both the man that lay with the woman, and the woman."' 3 As in the
Code of Hammurabi, for the crimes of rape and adultery, the woman is
charged with the offense of consent. The victim of the crime is her hus-
band. ' 4
The fact that a woman is never considered to be her own property' 5 is
10. How much the Code of Hammurabi influenced Mosaic Law is an open question.
The resemblances between the two constitute strong evidence that the Code is at least a
remote source of Mosaic civil and criminal laws. See generally THE PENTATEUCH AND
HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 404-06.
11. Deuteronomy 22: 23-27 (King James).
12. In discussing this law, Rabbi Hertz interprets the language as giving the woman
"the benefit of the doubt." See THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 846.
13. Deuteronomy 22: 22; see text accompanying note 9 supra.
14. Women are considered the spoils of war, and one "victimizes" one's enemies by
raping their women. In Deuteronomy 20:4, the soldiers are enjoined: "the women and the
little ones, and the cattle and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take
unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies ... .
15. She appears in a list of chattel in the following commandment: "Thou shalt not
covet thy neighbour's house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his manservant,
[Vol. 27:695
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made clearer by a third rape law appearing in Deuteronomy, concerning
the rape of an unbetrothed woman. The law states:
If a man find a damsel that is a virgin which is not betrothed, and
lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; [t]hen the
man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty
shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, because he hath hum-
bled her; he may not put her away all his days.
16
Since there is no husband to whom irreparable harm has been done, the
offense is therefore merely a civil one against the father. Whatever harm
he has suffered is remedied by the payment to him of his daughter's worth
prior to the assault. Deuteronomy also contains a sanction for the unbe-
trothed woman who consents and is not taken by force. When her crime is
later discovered by her bridegroom, she is brought "to the door of her
father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she
die. . . . 17 In this case, the paramour receives no penalty, while the wo-
man who consents receives the death penalty. Her crime is perhaps greater
because she has betrayed a trust. Like the woman of Babylon, she had
been entrusted with the safekeeping of something valuable which belonged
to another.
Seventeenth-century English law defined rape as "the carnal knowledge
of any woman above the age of ten years against her will . . ."1 Proof
that the act took place "against her will" was established, not by showing
that force was employed, but by evidence that the woman did not consent
to the act. Evidentiary laws, resembling the "country rape-city rape" law
of Deuteronomy,' 9 provided the following guidelines for the trier of fact:
[I]f the place wherein the fact was done, was remote from the
people inhabitants or passengers, if the offender fled for it; these
and the like are concurring evidence to give greater probability to
her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself.
20
But on the other side, if she concealed the injury for any con-
siderable time after she had opportunity to complain, if the place
where the fact was supposed to be committed were near to in-
nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbour's." THE
PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 1, at 300, discussing Exodus 20:17. In his com-
mentary, Rabbi Hertz defines "covet" as "to long for the possession of anything we cannot
get in an honest and legal manner." Id.
16. Deuteronomy 22:28-29.
17. Id. at 20-21.
18. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *62-68 [hereinafter cited as
PLEAS OF THE CROWN].
19. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12, supra.
20. Here, the woman's strongest case holds only if she has corroboration of third parties
to support it.
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habitants, or common recourse of passage and she made no out-
cry when the fact was supposed to be done, when and where it is
probable she might be heard by others; these and the like circum-
stances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony is false or
feigned.
21
There is a strong presumption of her guilt in the city, a weaker presump-
tion in the country. She must show that the place was remote or that al-
though the attack took place close to others she was unable to cry out, or
that she would not have been heard. None of these rules go to the issue of
force. Indeed, a second look at the law reveals that the word "force" does
not even appear. If she is successful in overcoming these presumptions, she
has proved only her non-consent,22 not his force, and is thus able only to
acquit herself. This requirement that she overcome the presumption of her
consent lends force to the theory that seventeenth-century English law did
not regard her as the victim of the rape.23
Both the Bible and the English common law accompanied American
settlers across the Atlantic, and in 1648 the first codification of these prin-
ciples occurred in Massachusetts. This code, entitled Laws and Liberties, 24
was based in large part upon the Laws of Moses25 and had as its premise
the proposition that the law of God contained in the Holy Scriptures ought
to be the foundation of all laws. 26 Whenever the common law of England
and the Laws of Moses conflicted, the conflict was resolved in favor of
21. PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 18, at *633.
22. Blackstone, comparing the English law favorably with Roman law, stated:
But our English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas of the honour of
either sex, as to lay the blame of a mutualfault upon one of the transgressors only;
and therefore makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime of rape, that it must be
against the woman's will.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *211 (emphasis added).
23. In Shakespeare's poem The Rape of Lucrece, the rapist, Tarquin, regrets his im-
pending assault because of the harm which will be suffered by Lucrece's husband, Collat-
tinus:
Had Collattinus kill'd my son or sire,
Or lain in ambush to betray my life,
Or were he not my dear friend, this desire
Might have excuse to work upon his wife,
As in revenge or quittal of such strife.
But as he is my kinsman, my dear friend,
The same and fault finds no excuse or end.
W. SHAKESPEARE, The Rape of Lucrece, lines 232-38, in SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE
WORKS (1st. ed. ca. 1600) (G.B. Harrison ed. 1952).
24. See T. Wolford, The Laws and Liberties of 1648, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
EARLY AMERICAN LAW, 147-185 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
25. Id. at 182, passim.
26. See id. at 151-52.
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Moses. Conveniently, the laws of rape presented no conflict. 27
Today's rape laws vividly reflect the rape laws of the past. A typical
common law definition of rape states that "[a] person commits rape when
he has carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will."
'28
There are, accordingly, two independent elements to the offense: force and
lack of consent. Instructions to the jury make it clear that for the offense to
be complete, both elements must be proved:
The crime of rape is the carnal knowledge by a man of a woman,
not his wife, by force and against her will.
In order for a person to be guilty of this offense the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the accused had carnal
knowledge of a female; (2) the victim was a female over the age
of ten years; (3) the victim was not his wife; (4) the act was com-
mitted without the consent and against the will of the victim.
29
Essentially this creates two crimes--consent and force-and two
criminals-the woman and her assailant. Because non-consent is an ele-
ment of the offense, and because a criminal defendant is innocent until
each element is established beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden is,
therefore, on the prosecutrix to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
she did not consent.
3 0
The issue of consent is commonly called an affirmative "consent de-
27. See Deuteronomy 22:25-27; PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 18, at 627.
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1978). See also ALA. CODE § 13-1-131 (1975); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.15.120 (1977); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-611 (Cum. Supp. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to 732 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6101 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
709.1 to 709.3 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3502 (1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65
(Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.260 (Vernon Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A; 138-1
(West 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West
1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (1969); S.C. CODE §§ 16-3-651 to 654 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3701 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3251 to 3253 (Cum. Supp.);
VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 6-
63 (Supp. 1975).
29. D. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.32, at 155-56 (1975)
(rape) (emphasis added). In addition, lack of consent is viewed as the crucial element of the
offense: "[T]he real test, which must be recognized in all [rape] cases, is whether the assault
was committed without the consent and against the will of the prosecuting witness." Hazel v.
State, 221 Md. 464, 470, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960).
Although the Maryland law concerning rape was changed in 1976, lack of consent has
been retained as an element of the crime. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 461 to 464 (Supp.
1977).
30. See State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 271 A.2d 752 (1970), and People v. Ser-
rielle, 354 Ill. 182, 188 N.E. 375 (1933), in which the courts found that non-consent was an
essential element for a rape conviction. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), (due
process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element which
constitutes the crime with which a defendant is charged).
1978]
Catholic University Law Review
fense. '' 3' In reality, however, it should not be referred to as a "defense",
since a defense is something which is raised initially by the defendant. For
example, in a specific intent crime, the presumption is that the charged
defendant was sober at the time of the commission of the crime. If the
issue of sobriety (or lack thereof) is raised at all, it is done so initially by
the defendant as an "intoxication defense" after the state has put on its
case in chief. The presumption rests against the defendant. In a trial for
rape, however, the state must prove force and non-consent before the de-
fendant puts on his defense.
32
Noting this anomaly, Wigmore has attempted to explain the phenome-
non as follows:
The apparently irregular process of negativing evidence not yet
formally introduced by the opponent is regular enough in reality,
because the impression upon the tribunal would otherwise be
there as if the opponent had really offered evidence of the wo-
man's silence. Thus the essence of the process consists in the
showing that the woman did not in fact behave with a silence
inconsistent with her present story. The courts have fully sanc-
tioned this analysis of the situation.
33
This process of proof is strange if consent is viewed as a defense of the
rapist. It is, however, not anomalous if the issue of consent is understood
as a defense which belongs to the rape victim, for it is she who must initi-
ate the issue of non-consent. The presumptions are against her, and she
has the burden of proof. In fact, if not in law, she is a co-defendant in the
crime of rape.
The victim of the crime today, as in times past, is the man to whom she
belongs. This is made clear by the fact that the law still refuses to define a
husband's act of forceful and unconsented intercourse with his wife as
rape.34 There is no legally cognizable harm done in this case because a
31. The consent defense is available in almost every state. See, e.g., Hazel v. State, 221
Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960): "[h]owever reluctantly given, consent to the act, at
any time prior to penetration purges the subsequent intercourse of its criminal character."
Id.
32. It is not enough for the jury to be convinced that force was used against the
victim. It is the job of the State's Attorney to persuade the jury of the victim's non-
consent before the defense puts on its case. Every State's Attorney who has prose-
cuted a rape case knows that this is necessary.
Interview with Mary Ann Willin, Deputy State's Attorney, Baltimore City, in Baltimore,
Md., Feb. 17, 1976.
33. 4 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1135 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
34. In virtually no state is it a crime for a husband to assault his wife sexually. Some
states have offered protection to the wife if the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to
a court order or separation agreement. See Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It The
Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463, 470-74 (1975).
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husband cannot "take" from himself something which is already rightfully
his.35 This situation is similar to the common law crime of adultery, in
which extramarital intercourse is a crime only if the woman involved is
married.36 A husband's marital status is irrelevant if he is a party to the
act. Accordingly, the act becomes criminal only when a husband who is
not a party to the act is "injured."
Thus, the aggrieved party, which the rape law seeks to protect, is not the
raped woman. Instead, the law protects her male possessor;37 she "be-
35. The legal fiction offered for this proposition is the "continuing consent" doctrine
articulated first by Hale: "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, supra note 18, at *629. The presumption of consent is conclusive. In Regina v.
Clarence, [18881 22 Q.B.D. 23, 37, the court stated: "Until the consent given at marriage be
revoked, how can it be said that the husband in exercising the marital right has assaulted his
wife?" For a discussion of the "continuing consent" doctrine, see Comment, Rape and Bat-
tery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1954).
In PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, the "continuing consent" doctrine is dismissed as
"double-talk". The author explains: "It is not necessary to pretend that the woman has con-
sented, if the facts show very clearly otherwise . . . . [T]he true reason why the husband,
who has sexual intercourse with his wife against her will, is not guilty of rape is that such
intercourse is not unlawful." PERKINs ON CRIMINAL LAW 156 (1969). See also S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 380-82 (Simon & Schuster
ed. 1975).
36. See text accompanying notes 9 & 13, supra. In both crimes it is the woman who is
married. When the common law crime was codified in Maryland, it was construed "to carry
its common law meaning, the test being whether the woman was married." Hughes v. State,
14 Md. App. 497, 505 n.7, 287 A.2d 299, 305 n.7 (1972). A married man and single woman,
therefore, cannot commit criminal adultery.
37. Kingsley Davis noted that "[tihe unscrupulous stand always ready to take posses-
sion in defiance of the rules. . . .They may at any stage, under peril of organized retalia-
tion, upset the procedure and seize physical possession of the property." He then stated:
"There are thus two dangers which beset any person with regard to property. The first is that
somebody will win out over him in legitimate competition.... The second is that somebody
will illegitimately take from him property already acquired. This is the danger of trespass."
Davis, Jealousy and Sexual Property, 14 Soc. FORCES 395, 396 (1936). Compare 4 S. FREUD,
COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (J. Riviere trans. 1925): "The demand that the girl shall bring with
her into marriage with one man no memory of sexual relations with another is after all
nothing but a logical consequence of the exclusive right of possession over a woman which is
the essence of monogamy."
The present-day rapist, like Shakespeare's Tarquin, perceives the man to whom the wo-
man belongs as the true victim of the crime. See note 23 supra. Of his own acts of rape,
Eldridge Cleaver wrote:
Rape was an insurrectionary act. It delighted me that I was defying and tram-
pling upon the white man's law, upon his system of values, and that I was defiling
his women-and this point, I believe, was the most satisfying to me because I was
very resentful over the historical fact of how the white man has used the black
woman.
E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 14 (McGraw-Hill 1968).
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longs" to him; she is a trustee of herself for him.38 Moreover, the prosecu-
tion of a rape is viewed as a cause of action for the wronged male; "[t]he
man responds to this undercutting of his status as 'possessor' of the girl
with hostility toward the rapist; no other restitution device is available.
The law of rape provides an orderly outlet for his vengeance.
'39
In sum, the rape and adultery laws of today are the same laws which
appeared four thousand years ago in the Code of Hammurabi, and the
twentieth-century woman carries the same burden as her Babylonian sis-
ter. She is a trustee of herself, and she is presumed to be untrustworthy.
4°
In Babylon, however, when force on the part of the male aggressor was
For a discussion of women as the spoils of war, see note 14 supra; BROWNMILLER, supra
note 35, at ch. 3.
38. A logical outgrowth of this role of trustee is the feeling of failure and shame which a
woman experiences if she is raped. One writer reported of a group of rape victims, "Every
one of the women suffered from the private conclusion that in some way it must have been
her fault." Sheehy, Nice Girls Don't Get Into Trouble, NEW YORK, Feb. 15, 1971, at 28.
Young girls are afraid of their parents' anger. Wives are afraid of reprisals from their hus-
bands. It is unlikely that female victims of robberies, in contrast, would share these feelings
of shame. Cf. note 86 infra.
One team of writers explains the woman's guilt as follows:
If the male forces his way in with a battering ram and captures the treasure, he
has succeeded in his purpose. There is no cause for guilt or remorse. The woman,
on the other hand, has failed in her purpose. She has allowed the treasure to be
taken and feels herself to be at fault.
A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 25 (1974).
39. Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objec-
tives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 73 (1952). The man whose woman has been
raped perceives himself to be the victim of the crime. A sociologist reports that the wish to
kill the rapist, by the males who are close to these women, is very common. She says that
"[a]ccording to the masculine mystique, a man must protect his female property. To fail as a
protector is to fail as a man. The only way for a man to rescue his image in this situation is
to be willing to be violent toward the interloper." D. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE 67
(1974).
40. This lack of trustworthiness, according to Freud, is a result of the inferior ethical
attributes of women:
I cannot evade the notion . . . that for women the level of what is ethically
normal is different from what it is in men . . . . That they show less sense of
justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the exigencies of life, that
they are more often influenced in their judgments by their feelings of affection or
hostility ....
S. FREUD, Some Psychic Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes, in 19
COMPLETE WORKS 257-58 (1923-25). The law, in its inevitable wisdom, is not unaware of
such theories. On the issue of such credibility, Wigmore says:
Modem psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young girls and
women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are
multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly. . . by temporary physio-
logical or emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men. . . . The real victim, however, too
often in such cases is the innocent man.
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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proved, his part of the crime was complete and he received the prescribed
penalty. He had a duty to forbear. If the woman failed to overcome the
presumptions of consent against her, she, too, was punished; one did not
preclude the other. This is no longer so. The law today does not condemn
the man who uses force against a "consenting" woman.
Unless a woman can overcome the strong presumptions against her, so-
ciety will adjudge her guilty of promiscuous behavior.-She must be on
guard at all times; if she appears "consenting," 4' she is fair game, both in
the eyes of the aggressor and in the eyes of the law.42 Regardless of the
force used against her and her credibility,43 a woman's act of consent, if
proved, places upon her the sole responsibility for the crime of rape.
III. THE RAPE SYSTEM TODAY
A woman who is raped enters the criminal justice system in the dual role
of defendant and witness. Since she is not the victim, it is misleading to
refer to her as such. A more accurate description of her legal status is that
41. Evidence of her consent may be inferred in many ways. For example, one writer has
noted: "It is everywhere conceded that in a prosecution for rape by force and against the will
of a female, her previous unchastity may be shown as rendering it more probable that she
consented to the act." Note, Statutory Rape-Desirability of Evidence That Female Was Pre-
viously Unchaste or Married in Mitigation of Punishment, 24 VA. L. REV.-335, 336 (1938).
For an in-depth discussion of the evidentiary problems in this area, see Berger, Man's
Trial, Woman's Tribulation.- Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52-69
(1977).
42. A woman's consent is measured by the man's perception of her actions, not her own.
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 249 Ala. 130, 30 So. 2d 256 (1947). A recently reported English
case took this view to its logical extreme:
The Lords asked themselves: Can "a man be said to have committed rape if he
believed that the woman was consenting," no matter how unreasonable the belief?
"I do not think he can" wrote Lord Cross of Chelsea as part of a 3-2 majority.
Thus, in theory, a man who believes no means yes cannot be convicted.
TIME, May 12, 1975, at 55.
The following reform standard has been offered to support a defense of mistaken belief:
that the complaining witness has engaged in consensual sexual activity with any
person under particular and characteristic circumstances sufficiently similar to
those of the encounter with the defendant so as to establish [sic] that she consented
to sexual intercourse with the defendant or that she acted in such a way as to lead
him to believe that she consented.
Berger, supra note 41, at 65 (quoting B. BABCOCK, A FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross,
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 841 (1975)).
43. In a footnote to a section which concerns itself with the moral character of a woman
complainant in a charge of rape, Wigmore states: "In urging psychiatric interviews for com-
plaining witnesses in sex cases, some prominent psychiatrists have explained that a woman
or a girl may falsely accuse a person of a sex crime as a result of a mental condition that
transforms into fantasy a wishful biological urge." 3A J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, n. 1
(Chadbourn rev. 1970) (quoting Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Ca.2d 159, 171-77, 410 P.2d
838, 846-50 (1966)).
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of a "defendant/witness." As a defendant, she is treated with distrust and
disbelief by each institution-hospital, police, prosecutor's office, judge,
jury-she encounters in order to press charges against her assailant. To
many of the individuals staffing these institutions, the defendant/witness
is, in effect, a criminal suspect.
A. The Hospital
Because much of the evidence which corroborates a rape can be gath-
ered only from medical examination, the defendant/witness who reports
her rape usually must submit to a physical examination." Many hospitals
are reluctant to treat defendant/witnesses because of the possibility of
court appearances for their personnel 45 and will do so only by prior ar-
rangement with the political jurisdiction involved. 46 Although speed is im-
44. When an adult woman contacts the police, who then take her to the hospital, no
question arises as to the availability of treatment at the hospital. When, however, a minor
reports the offense to the police, a question arises as to whether or not parental'consent is
required before the hospital may treat her. In Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(2)
(1976) frees physicians from civil or criminal liability for providing immediate medical
treatment without obtaining parental consent to minors who are victims of sexual abuse. In
Virginia, however, parental consent is required at certain hospitals before treatment can be
administered. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, A REPORT ON RAPE IN THE SUB-
URBS: RAPE RATE ON THE RISE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON 26 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as VIRGINIA REPORT]. Washington, D.C. hospitals also require parental consent
before treating a minor. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC
SAFETY COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON RAPE 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as D.C. REPORT].
The necessity of acquiring parental consent may discourage some minors from seeking treat-
ment. If the adult or minor presents herself directly to a hospital emergency room, a similar
problem exists with respect to notification of the police. In Baltimore, Maryland, because of
the contractual arrangement between the Police Department and the three hospitals which
have been designated to receive rape victims, the police must be notified before any eviden-
tiary tests can be taken. Treatment for injuries sustained is available without the hospital
notifying the police. REPORT OF THE BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL TASK FORCE ON RAPE, 21-
23 (1975). In Washington, D.C., the police are notified in all cases, even when the woman
seeks only treatment. D.C. REPORT, supra, at 18. In northern Virginia, police notification
appears to be discretionary. VIRGINIA REPORT, supra, at 25-26. Montgomery County, Mary-
land, hospitals notify the police, regardless of the woman's wishes. REPORT OF MONTGOM-
ERY COUNTY SEXUAL OFFENSES COMMITTEE 42-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
MONTGOMERY Co. REPORT]. The effect of mandatory police notification may be to discour-
age defendant/witnesses from seeking treatment. One hospital spokesman indicated that it
was the patient's decision whether or not to call the police, but added, "Besides, if she
doesn't want to report it, she probably wasn't really raped." VIRGINIA REPORT, supra, at 25.
45. At a hearing of the Maryland General Assembly's Special Committee on Rape and
Related Offenses in late 1976, doctors noted the reluctance of their colleagues to treat raped
women because the doctor might be called upon to testify in court. One doctor was quoted
as saying, "There are nothing but subpoenas, nothing but postponements, nothing but the
cancelling of office appointments." Baltimore Evening Sun, Oct. 14, 1976, § C, at 4, col. 6.
46. In Baltimore, Maryland, for example, to facilitate the collection of evidence, the
Police Department has contracted out the gathering of medical evidence in rape cases to
three hospitals. If a woman reports the attack to the police, the responding officers will take
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perative in gathering evidence of the alleged intercourse,47 some private
hospitals have turned women away,4 and many defendant/witnesses are
often faced with long waits in hospital emergency rooms.49 Aside from the
obvious psychological effects on the woman, the long wait is detrimental
for evidentiary purposes.50 Defendant/witnesses have also reported that
emergency room personnel are insensitive or uncooperative, as a result of
which women may leave prior to examination. 5'
Examining physicians are expected to record information relating to the
woman's emotional as well as physical condition. The Baltimore form, a
form supplied to Baltimore city hospitals by police departments in the met-
ropolitan area, provides the physician with nine adjectives to describe the
woman's mental state: crying, lethargic, depressed, agitated, angry,
shocked, unconscious, intoxicated, or apparently normal.52 Apparently the
woman should exhibit at least one of the first eight traits to be considered
credible. Defendant/witnesses, however, sometimes present a calm man-
ner 53 which may mislead the examining physician 54 and which, if noted on
the police form, may easily be construed in the courtroom as indicative of
her to one of the three hospitals. If she presents herself to some other hospital and is willing
to have the police notified of the incident, it is likely that she will not receive treatment at the
original hospital but will be transported by the police to one of the three specially designated
units. BALTIMORE COUNTY TASK FORCE ON RAPE CONTROL, REPORT TO THE COUNTY
COUNCIL, at 11-14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BALTIMORE Co. REPORT].
47. "The ability to find spermatozoa in the vagina would depend largely on the time
interval elapsing between the alleged act of coitus and the examination. One might expect to
find spermatozoa for twelve to eighteen hours after intercourse, but they could be missed
after a few hours." 5 A LAWYERS' MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA § 36.41 (1972).
48. This problem has been specifically noted in the Philadelphia area. Philadelphia In-
quirer, Sept. 11, 1975, § D, at 1, col. 7. See also Peters, Social, Legal, and Psychological
Effects ofRape on the Victim, 78 PA. MED. 34 (1975).
49. See MONTGOMERY Co. REPORT, supra note 44, at 42; PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,
MARYLAND, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE TREATMENT OF THE VICTIMS OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT 64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as P.G. Co. REPORT]; Hayman & Lanza, Vic-
timology of Sexual Assault, 5 MED. ASPECTS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 152, 158 (1971);
Mermey, Rape.: Who's On Trial? JURIS DOCTOR, Dec., 1974, at 23, 25.
50. See note 47 supra.
51. See P.G. Co. REPORT, supra note 49, at 60; VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 44, at 3;
Mermey, supra note 49, at 25; Hayman & Lanza, supra note 49, at 158 (referring to a case in
which the woman returned to the hospital for a followup visit but left before being examined
because her husband was not allowed to stay with her throughout the examination).
52. BALTIMORE Co. REPORT, supra note 46, at 34.
53. See, e.g., Sheehy, supra note 38, at 28; Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response
Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 503, 504 (1970).
54. "A lack of emotional response, such as residual fright, remorse, or bewilderment,
might indicate that the victim is fabricating the complaint." Enos, Beyer, & Mann, The Med-
ical Examination of Cases o/Rape, reprinted in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 221, 223 (L. Schultz ed.
1975). Another physician who has written on this subject suggests that "a casual, light-
hearted attitude about the rape" is cause for suspicion of the truth of the complainant's
story. MacDonald, Rape, POLICE, Mar., 1969, at 42, 44 (1969). One can only surmise how
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either consent 55 or a lack of credibility.
Often a defendant/witness must pay for the examination and laboratory
tests,56 making it unlikely that the full range of available tests will be em-
ployed. Fingernail scrapings are often not taken, 7 although such evidence
can be powerful corroboration. Combing the pubic area for hairs of the
rapist frequently is not done in the hospital.58 In Washington, D.C., for
example, police request the defendant/witness to perform this procedure
herself.59 Doctors are hesitant to conduct this relatively simple test, appar-
ently fearing that to do so would place them in the chain of custody of a
potentially important piece of evidence, which, if used, would necessitate
their appearance at trial.60 Indeed, there is evidence that doctors, due to
their unwillingness to testify in court, sometimes falsify the record or com-
plete it in such a manner that prosecution is foreclosed.
61
common this attitude is among physicians and its effect upon the cases of women seeking
treatment.
55. To combat the possibility of misinterpretation, Medea and Thompson suggest the
following to women who have been attacked:
Don't worry about restraining yourself or controlling your emotions. You have
too much to worry about without that, and it may hurt you to do so. The police and
the courts expect you to be distraught. No woman according to the myths or our
society, could actually go through a rape without coming close to insanity. It is,
after all, a fate worse than death. If you seem calm, you are unlikely to be believed,
whatever that calmness may cost you in emotional energy. Your attitude will be
brought up in court as evidence. Women have been known to lose rape cases be-
cause the shock following the attack brought on a false calmness and lucidity.
MEDEA & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 118.
56. MONTGOMERY Co. REPORT, supra note 44, at 46, 48-49; VIRGINIA REPORT, supra
note 44, at 26; D.C. REPORT, supra note 44 at 16; Baltimore Morning Sun, July 23, 1975, §
C, at 1, col. 7 (concerning Baltimore County practices). At least four states-California,
CAL. GOV'T CODE, § 13961.5 (West Supp. 1975); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.51
(West Supp. 1977); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 217.280 to 217.350, 440.244 (1975); Ohio,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.28 (Page Supp. 1975)-have enacted legislation providing
that a rape victim's medical care is to be paid for by the state. see Note, Rape Reform
Legislation.- Is I the Solution, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463, 494 (1975).
57. MONTGOMERY Co. REPORT, supra note 44, at 44; D.C. REPORT, supra note 44, at
18.
58. MONTGOMERY Co. REPORT, supra note 44, at 44; D.C. REPORT, supra note 44, at
17; Peters, supra note 48, at 35.
59. D.C. REPORT, supra note 44, at 17-18.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 16; doctors in two Virginia hospitals admitted that the possibility of court
appearances temper their treatment of assaulted women. VIRONIA REPORT, supra note 44, at
26-27. A woman who was cut reported that there was no indication of the cuts on the medi-
cal report. Mermey, supra note 49, at 25. In United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir.
1972), a District of Columbia doctor had written a completely negative medical report on a
defendant/witness, indicating no bruises, scratches, abrasions, or lacerations. The prosecu-
tor, however, had photographs of the woman which totally contradicted the medical report.
In addition, the medical report contained no indication that the woman involved was men-




The police must make the "founding" decision-the initial determina-
tion whether a charge of rape is true. A primary concern of the police is
how recently the rape occurred, and the promptness of a complaint is con-
sidered to be an important factor in judging the woman's credibility.
62
Failure to make a prompt complaint to the police is "universally conceded
to be a damaging circumstance against the woman making the charge."
'63
A defendant/witness, however, may be reluctant initially to report the at-
tack due to any one of a number of reasons, such as fear of publicity or
mistrust of the police.64 Thus, any connection attempted between speed in
complaining and truth of the complaint is rather speculative.
Another factor considered by the police is the appearance of the defend-
ant/witness. If she appears provocative, police are likely to believe that
intercourse was consensual. 65 Similarly, an unattractive woman is thought
to be less credible, on the theory that no rapist would actually choose an
unattractive victim. 66 When a complainant has behaved in a "provocative"
that it was his habit to ask each defendant/witness what injuries she had and only then
would he examine her. Apparently, the retarded woman did not give an articulate descrip-
tion of her injuries. Although the doctor was subpoenaed to testify at the trial, he failed to
appear. Judge Bazelon recommended that the Department of Justice investigate the possibil-
ity that examining physicians at D.C. General Hospital routinely issued negative medical
reports in order to avoid court appearances. Id. at 1136.
62. Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed-
Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 282-86 (1968).
63. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 284 (3rd ed. 1940). Although this quotation refers to the
relevance at trial of evidence that a woman delayed in complaining, it accurately describes
why police officers also deem the information relevant.
64. See, e.g., MEDEA & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 111-22; Griffin, Rape- The All-
American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971 at 32 (1971).
65. In an attempt to explain police skepticism towards certain groups of women, one
commentator proffered:
Prostitutes, as part of their profession, may have to accept being treated as sexual
objects. But liberated women usually define themselves in terms of their rejection
of such objectification. Both groups, however, are considered by others as deviant.
Their sexual activity evokes hostile reactions by conventional society and its repre-
sentatives in the criminal justice system. The widely-held conception that rape is
primarily a sexual act easily leads to the argument that for sexually experienced
women one more "act" should not matter.
Weiss & Borges, Victimology and Rape." The Case of the Legitimate Victim, 8 IssuEs IN
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 96 (1973).
66. This theory is based on the premise that rape is a sexual crime, rather than a crime
of violence. Unfortunately this view of rape is not unique to police officers:
[Mien have a vested interest in maintaining the definition of the situation as prima-
rily sexual and seductive rather than rapacious. If the man can call the act seduc-
tion, he may call himself a winner; if it is rape, he is a loser. When he had to use
force, his masculinity proved insufficient.
Id. at 86-87.
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manner, such as hitchhiking67 or drinking,68 police are less likely to be-
lieve her story. Again, provocative behavior is equated with promiscuity,
which implies consent. The location of the attack may also be significant to
the police.69 Women who go unaccompanied to bars or cocktail lounges or
who walk alone at night are thought to invite trouble.70 As in the case of
the provocative victim, the police assume that a woman who has placed
herself in what they perceive to be a vulnerable situation, has, in effect,
consented to whatever happened while she was there. The police also con-
sider the relationship between the parties7' in arriving at the founding de-
cision. If the parties are total strangers, police skepticism is reduced.
When, however, the woman knows her attacker, no matter how superfi-
cially, the police may be reluctant to believe the intercourse at issue was
not consensual; "[tlhe assumption is that a man known by the victim must
be her boyfriend . . . . Rape by a body recognizable to the woman is
Love." 7
2
Police treatment of factors such as the victim's appearance and behavior,
the location of the attack, and the relationship between the parties, bears a
curious resemblance to the tort concept of assumption of risk.73 Appar-
ently, the defendant/witness should have been aware of the risk which her
appearance and conduct created. Shifting the blame in this manner, how-
ever, is fundamentally unsound. Not only is the connection between ap-
pearance and provocation disputable, but the legal analogy is inapposite.
In tort law, the defense of assumption of risk is applicable only to negli-
gence actions. It has absolutely no bearing on an intentional tort. Rape is
an intentional crime, and any rationale attributing some measure of re-
67. MEDEA & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 24, 98. See also Annapolis Evening Capital,
Apr. 19, 1976, at 11, col. 3.
68. Comment, supra note 62, at 292.
69. Id. at 290-91.
70. MacDonald, supra note 54, at 43-44.
71. Comment, supra note 62, at 291-92.
72. Sheehy, supra note 38, at 28. One writer has noted that men are "aware of the
notion that rape can only be committed by a stranger. This deft ition can serve as a justifica-
tion since it precludes the possibility that [a man] can be called a rapist after an encounter
with a woman who knew his name." Weiss & Borges, supra note 65, at 87.
73. Certain writers have recognized the existence of the doctrine. In describing his no-
tion of "victim precipitated rape," sociologist Menachim Amir wrote:
Some situations, which we term vulnerable, are so fraught with danger that any
action on the victim's part would be risky. With relation to that kind of situation,
her conduct needs to be judged-that is, did she add to the risk without realizing it,
or did she know her actions might have consequences but took a chance anyway.
M. AMIR, PATrERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 264-65 (1971).
In their classic study of jury behavior, Kalven and Zeisel remarked on the strong resem-
blance of forcible rape cases to assumption of risk tort cases. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 249 (1966). See notes 100-13 and accompanying text, infra.
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sponsibility to the defendant/witness because she assumed the risk is to-
tally inappropriate and has no place in the founding decision.
74
Another facet of the attack which influences the police is the defend-
ant/witness's behavior during the attack.75 If she vigorously resisted and
received bruises or torn clothing, so as to document the struggle, her story
is more credible than if she had emerged unscathed. Many women who
submitted because of threats of physical harm have found that their stories
were met with great skepticism from the police.76 Even though women are
instructed by police never to fight when facing the barrel of a gun,77 their
decision to value their life over forced intercourse endangers their credibil-
ity before the same people who have advised compliance.
78
The races of the defendant/witness and her attacker are also of consid-
erable importance to the police.79 If a white woman complains that she has
been raped by a black man, the police will quickly respond.80 When the
defendant/witness is a black woman, however, the fact of her race aggra-
vates her lack of credibility, particularly on the issue of consent. Her con-
74. Weiss and Borges provide a direct criticism of Amir in their discussion of the "mis-
leading application of the victimological concept of victim-precipitation to the field of rape:
'Based upon the notion of the guilty female, this concept has become, until now, an unques-
tioned part of the criminological-victimological discussion of rape. It is the personflcation
and embodiment of the rape mythology clevery stated in academic-scientific terms.'" Weiss &
Borges, supra note 65, at 87 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
75. See Comment, supra note 62, at 293-99.
76. Id. at 288.
77. "If a guy grabs you, scream," says [Chicago Police Sergeant] Sanburg. "If he's got a
knife at your throat or a gun at your head, relax and enjoy it." MEDEA & THOMPSON, supra
note 38, at 71, (quoting T. Schultz, Rape, Fear, and the Law).
78. One police officer is quoted as saying: "If your life is in danger, don't fight. If you
submit, at least you're alive to identify the assailant." Schurr, Most Defenses Against Rape
"Out-dated, "PIrSBURGH FORUM, Dec. 17, 1971, at 7. (One of a series of articles by Ms.
Schurr available as "Rape: Victim as Criminal" from KNOW, Inc., P.O. Box 86031, Pitts-
burgh, Pa. 15221).
79. Comment, supra note 62, at 302-06.
80. Many people believe that any physical relationships between a black man and a
white woman can only be rape. A black woman, writing in 1895 about the lynching of black
men for allegedly raping white women explained:
With the Southern white man, any mesalliance existing between a white woman
and a colored man is a sufficient foundation for the charge of rape. The Southern
white man says that it is impossible for a voluntary alliance to exist between a
white woman and a colored man, and, therefore, the fact of an alliance is a proof of
force.
Barnett, 4 Red Record, in BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 202 (G. Lerner ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA].
A recent case which shows that attitudes may not have changed dramatically since 1895 is
Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966), in which a black man was charged
with raping a white woman. The court stated: "In cases not involving inter-racial situations,
the issue of consent may be and frequently is very real. . . [but such] is much less likely to
be present in cases in which white women have been attacked by Negro men." Id. at 720.
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sent to sex is often presumed.81 Added to this stereotype of the
promiscuous black woman is the police perception of "the cultural sub-
group norms governing conduct among Negroes."'82 Believing that the
black community tolerates assaults and other criminal activity that mem-
bers of the white community would call criminal, police may discount the
seriousness of a rape charge brought by a black woman against a black
man.83 But this perception of the black community does not coincide with
the norms perceived by blacks, as is evidenced by the many complaints of
rape brought by black women against black men.84 In sum, racial indicia
are utterly irrelevant 85 and their use in the founding determination is pa-
tently invidious.
86
81. According to historian Gerda Lerner, the myth of the "bad" black woman was cre-
ated to rationalize the continued sexual exploitation of black women after slavery ended.
BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 80, at 163. Lerner also explains the myth
regarding black men as bestial rapists as "the twin of the myth of the bad black wo-
man-both designed to apologize for and facilitate the continued exploitation of black men
and women." Id. at 193.
82. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 174-76 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Schurr, "Double Standards" Lurk in Rape's Shadows, PITTSBURGH Fo-
RUM, Nov. 19, 1971, at 2.
84. See J. Peters, The Philadelphia Rape Victim Study at 13 (Sept. 1973) (paper pre-
pared for Philadelphia General Hospital Center for Studies in Sexual Deviance). Of the rape
victims treated by Peters, 77% were black. In Amir's study, 80.5% of the victims were black.
M. AMIR, supra note 73, at 44.
85. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 62, at 307.
86. The invalidity of all the criteria used in rape cases becomes even more apparent
when they are applied to crimes other than rape. The use of these factors in another situa-
tion, such as robbery, easily demonstrates their absurdity. The following parody is a hypo-
thetical cross-examination of a robbery victim in which some of these factors are applied:
Mr. Smith, you were held up at gunpoint in the comer of First and Main?
Yes.




Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands rather than
resist?
Yes.
Did you scream? Cry out?
No. I was afraid.
I see. Have you ever been held up before?
No.
Have you ever given money away?
Yes, of course.
And you did so willingly?
What are you getting at?
Well let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past. In
fact, you have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure that you
weren't contriving to have your money taken from you by force?
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C The Prosecutor's Office
The decision to initiate prosecution rests primarily with the prosecutor,
87
who is vested with broad discretion. Such discretion is essential because of
the ambiguity of the substantive criminal law, the existence of unrealistic
laws governing morality, the crowded dockets, and the limitations inherent
in applying any broad criminal statute.88 Courts are reluctant to interfere
in the exercise of this discretion by ordering a prosecutor to initiate prose-
cution in any particular case.89 The decision to prosecute is based on the
evidence from the police and medical investigations. However, the prose-
cutor's options are severely limited by what has happened before the case
ever reaches him or her, since the evidence a prosecutor receives is the
product of discretion which hospital personnel 90 and police9 have already
exercised.
To go forward at this stage, the prosecutor must be convinced that the
defendant/witness is innocent of the crime of consent. Since rape has been
defined in terms of two discrete elements, force and non-consent, the pros-
ecutor knows that, even if there is clear evidence of the use of force by the
Listen, if I wanted...
Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?
About 11:00 p.m.
You were out on the street at 11:00 p.m.? Doing what?
Just walking.
Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street that late at
night.
Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?
I hadn't thought about it.
What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?
Let's see . . . a suit. Yes, a suit.
An expensive suit?
Well-yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know.
In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late at night in a
suit that practically advertised the fact that you might be a good target for some
easy money, isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't know better, Mr. Smith, we might
even think that you were asking for this to happen, mightn't we?
House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of Rape Under the Houston
Amendments, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975).
87. See, e.g., Baker, The Prosecutor--Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. CRIM. L. & C. 770
(1933); Kaplan, Prosecutorial Discretion--Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174 (1965); Note,
Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955).
88. See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42
S. CAL. L. REV. 519 (1969).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury
January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762
(D.D.C. 1963); State v. Aquilla, 18 Md. App. 487, 309 A.2d 44 (1973); Brack v. Wells, 184
Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319, 156 A.L.R. 324 (1944).
90. See notes 44-61 & accompanying text, supra.
91. See notes 62-86 & accompanying text, supra.
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male defendant, unless it can be clearly proven to the jury that the female
defendant did not consent, there would be little or no likelihood of success
and, hence, no reason to take the case to trial.
92
Although formalized guidelines93 for making the decision to prosecute a
rape case are rare, most prosecutors comply with an unwritten set of stand-
ards. The factual pattern which most easily leads to conviction is the one in
which a black man jumps out from the bushes or the alley and violently
forces himself on an attractive, young, modestly dressed white woman.
94
The closer the actual facts fit this model, the more likely it is that a prose-
cutor will try the case. Since prosecutors like to accumulate convictions
and avoid wasting time by prosecuting losing cases, they use this model as
a guideline for the exercise of their discretion. Of course, other factors,
such as the possibility of plea bargaining and general calendar manage-
ment concerns, will also be considered. 95 In addition, the prosecutor's own
feelings about the crime, whether consciously or not, may enter into the
decision-making process.
D. The Judge and the Jury
Although most rape cases which actually reach the trial stage are tried
before a jury,96 the judge plays a most important role. The judge sets the
tone of the courtroom, rules on the admissibility of evidence, and can con-
trol, to some extent, the behavior of the defense attorney, the prosecutor,
and the witnesses. While some observers have noted that judges are
harsher than juries, and would convict in many cases in which juries have
acquitted or have convicted of a lesser charge,97 judges, in general, reveal
many of the same response patterns as do police and prosecutors. One re-
searcher, after interviewing thirty-eight Philadelphia trial judges, con-
cluded that there is "a fairly high level of judicial skepticism toward those
who allege rape."98 Judges view women in one of three ways: as genuine
92. "It is not enough for the jury to be convinced that force was used against the victim.
It is the job of the State's Attorney to persuade the jury of the victim's non-consent ...."
Interview with Mary Ann Willin, Deputy State's Attorney, Baltimore City, in Baltimore
Md., Feb. 17, 1976.
93. Although some prosecutor's offices may, in fact, have policy manuals, it appears
that the standards are "largely tacit." Kaplan, supra note 87, at 178. It has been recom-
mended that the standards be recorded and published. Comment, supra note 88, at 542.
94. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 216.
95. See Cates, Can We Ignore Laws?-Discretion Not to Prosecute, 14 ALA. L. REV. 1
(1961); Comment, supra note 88.
96. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 35, at 373.
97. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 73, at 253-54.
98. Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUD. 303, 304 (1974). For a
particularly offensive example of judicial attitudes, see Snowden v. State, 33 Md. App. 659,
365 A.2d 321 (1976).
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victims, as participants in consensual intercourse, 99 or as vindictive fe-
males. Although sympathetic to the "genuine" and child victims, the re-
search showed that judges were relatively unconcerned about the others,
particularly if black. As one judge explained, "With the Negro community
you have to redefine rape. You never know about them."'1
For those cases which do reach a jury trial, the members of the jury are
the final arbiters of the guilt or innocence of the defendant/witness. There-
fore, their attitudes towards her and her consent are crucial. The pre-
sumptions jurors bring with them to the jury box coincide with the
presumption in law that the defendant/witness is guilty of the crime of
consent. Two sociologists who have conducted a study of jury functioning
conclude that jurors tend "to weigh the conduct of the victim in judging
the guilt of the defendant."'' 1 Juries acquitted the male defendant in con-
sent defense cases when the defendant/witness had been drinking with the
defendant,' 0 2 or when she had met the defendant at a night club or bar
and allowed him to take her home. 103 Similarly, if she had had intercourse
with the defendant previously' °4 or if she had illegitimate children, 105 the
99. Some judges have defined "consensual" rather loosely. Bohmer cites the following
judicial definitions of "consensual intercourse:" "friendly rape," "felonious gallantry," "as-
sault with failure to please," and "breach of contract." Bohmer, SUpra note 97, at 305. A
Wisconsin judge, recently presented with a case in which three teenaged boys allegedly
raped a 16 year-old girl, noted the sexually permissive atmosphere of the community and the
provocative nature of women's clothing. He questioned, "Should we punish severely a 15-
or-16-year old who reacts normally to it?" Baltimore Evening Sun, May 28, 1977, § A, at 3,
col. 1. The girl in the case was wearing blue jeans and a blouse over a turtleneck sweater.
The judge, Archie Simonson, was subsequently defeated in a recall election. Baltimore
Morning Sun, Sept. 8, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 5. The attitudes on women and rape which
prompted Judge Simonson's well-publicized remarks are not unique to him. In Colorado,
District Court Judge Dean C. Mabry dismissed a charge of sexual assault against a man
accused of breaking into the home of a young widow, pushing her against the wall, and
sexually assaulting her on the floor. The judge said, "This is more like an attempted seduc-
tion than it is sexual assault, albeit a little bit rough, but that is the way I remember it. It has
been quite a while." Id., Dec. 29, 1977, § A, at 12, col. 1.
100. Bohmer, supra note 97 at 307. Recognition of this double standard, however, may
mandate changes for black-on-black crime. One defense attorney, representing a black man
accused of raping a black woman, sought a postponement of the accused rapist's trial in
order to avoid appearing before a black "militant" judge. As the attorney explained it, this
particular judge, cognizant of the fact that crime in the black community is dismissed casu-
ally, "goes down real hard" when a black rapes a black. Conversation with an attorney,
Baltimore City, Feb. 23, 1976.
101. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 73, at 243. The Chief Assistant District Attorney for
San Francisco is reported to have said that "jurors look on rape cases with more distrust
than any other case. I've heard men and women, while being examined for jury duty, say
they didn't believe a woman could be raped under any circumstances." Margolin, Rape.- The
Facts, 3(1) WOMEN: A JOURNAL OF LIBERATION 19 (1972).
102. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 73, at 250.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 251.
105. Id.
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jury tended to acquit the rapist. These considerations are relevant to the
failure of the defendant/witness to meet her burden of proof on the issue
of consent and do not address the issue of force at all. 10 6 When the jury
had the opportunity to convict of a lesser charge in these cases, it did;
when it did not, it acquitted. 0 7 Although this tendency was not as pro-
nounced in cases of aggravated rape, 10 8 the authors noted several cases of
leniency toward the men charged. 10 9
In another study, two psychologists found that in order for a juror to
sustain the belief that this is a just world, a place in which individuals get
what they deserve and deserve what they get, jurors tend to attribute fault
to rape victims,1 ° often inferring that the defendant/witness was of bad
character or that she behaved in such a way as to cause her attack. The
more respectable and responsible a victim, the greater the tendency of the
jurors to attribute responsibility for the incident to her in order to maintain
their own feelings of security in the justness of the world.
The fact that jurors attempt to impose rationality on what may seem an
irrational world does not, however, fully explain their leniency toward
male defendants and their resultant harshness to defendant/witnesses.
Jury members reflect contemporary social and sexual mores which portray
women as sex objects which men legitimately seek to possess."' Two state-
ments by jurors illustrate this attitude. In one case, in which a jury acquit-
ted a man who had been positively identified as having raped a nineteen
year-old woman, a juror was quoted as saying, "I just couldn't believe that
a boy whose girlfriend was as pretty as the one who came into court to
testify would have wanted to rape such a plain-looking girl."' 12 A second
example is the statement of a juror in the widely reported Inez Garcia case.
Ms. Garcia had alleged that she had been raped by one man while being
106. Kalven and Zeisel describe one case in which the woman's jaw was fractured in two
places, yet the jury was still lenient to the male defendants. Id. at 251. In their opinion,
"This rewriting of the law of rape to accommodate the [male] defendant when the female
victim has taken the risk is on occasion carried to a cruel extreme." Id. Jury instructions
make it clear that the issues of force and consent are to be considered separately. See, e.g.,
text accompanying note 29 supra.
107. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 73, at 250.
108. "Aggravated Rape" is defined as including "all cases in which there is evidence of
extrinsic violence or in which there are several assailants involved, or in which the defendant
and the victim are complete strangers at the time of the event." Id. at 252.
109. Id. at 251.
110. Jones & Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectabil-
ity of the Victim, 26 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 415 (1973).
111. See Davis, Jealousy and Sexual Property, 14 Soc. FORCES 395 (1936).




held by another. Approximately twenty minutes after the attack she got a
gun, pursued the accomplice, and killed him. Her defense of impaired con-
sciousness caused by the rape was ineffective and she was convicted of
second degree murder.1 13 At the conclusion of the case, one of the jurors
was asked if the ground of self-defense could ever be available to a rape
victim who killed her attacker during the attack. The juror responded:
"No, because the guy's not trying to kill her. He's just trying to give her a
good time. To get off, the guy will have to do her bodily harm and giving a
girl a screw isn't doing her bodily harm . " 11. 4
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW TIMES
The treatment which the defendant/witness receives at the hands of the
police, medical personnel, prosecutors, and trial participants closely resem-
bles that which "recognized" defendants are accustomed to receiving. The
defendant/witness is presumed guilty, assumed to be untrustworthy, and is
handled with contempt and disdain. The legal requirement of proof of her
lack of consent is one of the major reasons why she is treated as a defend-
ant and subjected to hostility.
There is simply no reason to treat the rape victim as a defendant. Lack
of consent should not be an essential element of the crime of rape. A wo-
man who is forced by violence, or by the threat of it, to engage in sexual
intercourse has not consented to that intercourse. By eliminating the ele-
ment of consent, the rape victim would no longer be treated as a defend-
ant. She would no longer be forced to prove her innocence on the issue of
consent. The sole defendant in a rape case would be the male assailant.
Michigan has redefined the crime of rape as the sexual penetration or
contact with force or coercion by the attacker." 15 The degrees of serious-
ness of the crime depend primarily upon the extent of physical injury done
to the victim. The word "consent" does not even appear in the statute. It is
hoped that with time the elimination of the rape victim's defendant status
in Michigan will filter down to the police station, the hospital emergency
room, the prosecutor's office, and the courtroom, and that all personnel
who deal with rape victims will begin to internalize the newly formulated
legal concept that a show or threat of force renders consent impossible.
113. Ms. Garcia was originally convicted in 1974. That conviction was overturned in
1975 on technical grounds. See People v. Garcia, 54 Cal. App. 3d 61, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1975). She was retried in 1977 and acquitted. Baltimore Evening Sun, March 5, 1977, § A,
at 3, col. 4.
114. Blitman & Green, Inez Garcia On Trial, Ms., May, 1975, at 86 (used with permis-
sion of authors).
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520a to 750.520b (Supp. 1977-78).
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If a state is unwilling to adopt the Michigan approach," l6 it should at
least recognize the dual status of the rape victim. If she is to remain both a
defendant and a witness, the state must adopt appropriate protections for
the victim in her status as a defendant. Such protections should center on
the prosecutor's office. Changes made there will affect how the defend-
ant/witness is treated in the courtroom. Since actions by hospital employ-
ees and police in their encounters with the victim are courtroom-
oriented,' 17 changes in the trial should affect the treatment by hospital and
police personnel as well.
First, the prosecutor must recognize that (s)he is the defendant/witness's
defense attorney. Recognition of this heretofore implicit relationship
means that the prosecutor can no longer treat the victim merely as a wit-
ness. (S)he would be obligated to treat her in the same manner as a de-
fense attorney treats a client. Thus, the prosecutor must inform the
defendant/witness of the specific procedures anticipated (e.g., line-up, pre-
liminary hearing, trial), the embarrassment and public exposure she would
be likely to experience by participating, any benefits she might receive,
and alternative ways in which the prosecutor might proceed (e.g., plea bar-
gaining, diversion to the juvenile court system if the male suspect is a juve-
nile, reducing the rape charge to assault or some lesser charge). Each
alternative has different consequences for the defendant/witness and these
consequences also ought to be fully explained to her."1
8
116. Many other states have also recently rewritten their laws on rape. Michigan, how-
ever, goes the furthest toward eliminating the status of victim as defendant. The other re-
written laws include ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1801 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401 to
410 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-65 to 53a-90 (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§
761 to 773 (Cum. Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §§
5 10.010 to 510.150 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341 to 609.36 (West Cum. Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-408.1 to 28-408.05 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A-I to 632-
A-4 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-9-20 to 40A-9-26 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL
LAWS (Consol.) §§ 130.00 to 130.65 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
12.1-20-09 to 12.1-20-15 (Crim. Code Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01 to
2907.37 (Page Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305 to 163.475 (1977); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3101 to 3106, 3121 to 3127 (Purdon 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-
22-12 (Supp. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5 §§ 21.01 to 21.12 (Vernon 1974 & Supp.
1978); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.140 to 9.79.220 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-1 to
61-8B-13 (1977).
117. See notes 44-86 & accompanying text, supra. See also Note, Rape Reform Legisla-
tion. Is it The Solution?, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 463 (1975).
118. There is, however, some evidence of a growing sensitivity of prosecutors towards
rape victims. For example, in the District of Columbia, an assistant U.S. attorney recently
requested a D.C. Superior Court judge not to require the live testimony of two rape victims
at the retrial of their alleged assailant because of the emotional strain it would pose for them.
The prosecutor said, "We just feel that they have gone through enough. To require them to
testify again . . . would cause serious damage to their health." Washington Post, Dec. 1,
1977, § B, at 1, col. 2.
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If going to trial is a viable alternative, both the defendant/witness and
the prosecutor must be convinced of its value before a decision to do so is
reached. The defendant/witness is entitled to some voice in the manage-
ment of her defense, not unlike that given to traditional defendants. Like
her male co-defendant, she must be apprised of the risks of taking the
stand and must be given the choice of whether to testify in her own behalf.
Traditional defendants participate in trial strategies in many other ways. A
rape victim, in her role as co-defendant, is entitled to similar consideration.
The special role of the defendant/witness in rape cases demands a deci-
sionmaking process which includes both the prosecutor and the woman
attacked. If the defendant/witness feels that the prosecutor has misman-
aged her defense by acting against her wishes, she should be able to sue the
prosecutor for legal malpractice.119
To encourage the development of an attorney-client relationship be-
tween defendant/witness and prosecutor, a privilege must be established
for communications between the two. This privilege is necessary to allow a
relationship of trust to develop between them and to remove those obsta-
cles which currently prevent the defendant/witness from being completely
honest with the prosecutor, such as the fear that anything she says will be
subsequently used against her. This privilege must be developed in the
face of existing case law which typically affords no privilege to a com-
plaining witness.' 20 Maryland recognizes a limited privilege for communi-
cation between prosecutor and prosecutrix but historically has created an
exception when the testimony given by the prosecutrix at trial is contrary
to her earlier statement to the prosecutor.' 21 Such authority, old though it
may be, serves as the foundation for a privilege which recognizes the fact
that, in reality, a rape victim is also a defendant. 22 With regard to that
119. Although the immunity of prosecutors from suit is well established, see e.g. Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), this immunity is granted only with respect to prosecutorial
duties. A defendant/witness should be able to bring suit if the prosecutor fails in the role of
her defense attorney. The policies served by prosecutorial immunity have no bearing in this
unique situation. Here, prosecutors are more like public defenders who are not immune
from civil suit. See Barto v. Felix, 22 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct., Oct. 6,
1977); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975); but see., Brown v. Joseph,
463 F.2d 1046 (3rd Cir. 1972) (court-appointed attorney is immune from suit brought by
former client under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
120. [The complaining witness] can be considered in no other light than a witness
on the part of the people, communicating to the law officer of the government, his
knowledge in relation to the commission of a supposed crime, and inquiring of that
officer whether the facts thus communicated amounted to an offense.
Granger v. Warrington, 8 Ill. 299, 309 (1846).
See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2375(o (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
121. See, e.g., Riggins v. State, 125 Md. 165, 173, 93 A. 437, 438 (1915).
122. If "convicted," a rape victim faces not incarceration but social stigma and ostracism.
Similar damage to reputation has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a possible in-
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aspect of her role, the lack of a fully articulated privilege violates her right
against self-incrimination.
This proposed privilege must, however, be distinguished from the obli-
gation of the prosecutor to disclose evidence which is exculpatory.
23
There is no reason to undercut the prohibition against the prosecutor mis-
representing the evidence 124 or allowing false testimony to go uncor-
rected.' 25 Nevertheless, information which is within the prosecutor's
knowledge but is originally inadmissible at the trial on the issue of the
substantive crime should remain privileged. 26 Limited in this way, the
privilege would not prevent the accused rapist from learning any informa-
tion which would be useful and relevant at trial, but it would eliminate the
possibility that the defense might abuse or misuse such information, as
typically happens. 27 Evidence of her sexual history should usually not be
revealed by the prosecutor. Not only is such evidence irrelevant to the is-
sue of her consent, 28 but, because of its inflammatory and highly prejudi-
cial nature, it also should not be used to impeach the credibility of the
defendant/witness. Prior sexual history may still become admissible on
cross-examination if the direct testimony of the defendant/witness has
opened the door to it. If, for example, the rape occurred as the defend-
ant/witness was leaving her boyfriend's apartment one morning, the fact
that she stayed overnight at a male's apartment has no bearing on the issue
of her consent to intercourse with the assailant and should be inadmissible
on that issue. But if the defendant/witness testifies on direct examination
that the attack occurred as she was leaving her parents' house that morn-
ing, the fact that she had, in truth, been staying overnight at her boy-
fringement upon one's constitutionally protected interest in liberty. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972): Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). For other arguments
in support of additional constitutionally protectable rights of the rape victim, see Berger,
supra note 41, at 41-51.
123. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States ex rel. Montgomery v.
Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
124. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
125. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1958).
126. But see Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98-102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
127. The burden rests on the defense to seek out information which will never become
admissible but which might point the way to other information which may be admissible.
This burden will not be overwhelming, since clearly exculpatory information is required to
be divulged. See note 122 supra. The Constitution does not demand that information which
is merely helpful to the defense must be revealed. Giles v. Maryland 386 U.S. 66, 116-19
(1967), (Harlan, J., dissenting); but see id. at 98-102 (Fortas, J., concurring).
128. In a recent opinion, one court analyzed and rejected the validity of the use of past
sexual conduct for impeachment purposes, facetiously suggesting that if this evidence were
held admissible as to the credibility of the prosecuting witness in a case of rape, it should be
equally admissible for impeachment purposes for any female witness in any case. See State
ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946, 950 (1976).
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friend's would be a proper subject for impeachment. Should the
defendant/witness open the door by lying on direct examination, the pros-
ecutor's knowledge must then become available to the defense. This bur-
den would fall on the prosecutor, who is under an ethical obligation to
supplement the response to discovery.129 A brief recess could be called be-
tween direct and cross-examination of the defendant/witness, so that the
prosecutor could reveal to the defense lawyer the prior inconsistent state-
ment of the defendant/witness.130 Although perhaps a time-consuming
and inefficient procedure, such a mid-trial recess would protect the rights
of the defendant/witness and not infringe upon those of the technical de-
fendant.
The privilege should encompass specific incidents of the sexual history
of the defendant/witness,' 3' her juvenile record, ' 32 and specific acts of her
misconduct. 3 3 Misuse of this kind of information makes the trial an
ordeal for the defendant/witness. An experienced defense attorney, aware
of the inadmissible fact that the victim and a male companion who was not
her husband had been engaged in sexual intercourse when the alleged rap-
ist surprised them, might very well say, when cross-examining the prosecu-
trix, "And isn't it so, Mrs. X, that you and your boyfriend were having sex
at the time?" 134 For most criminal defendants, the introduction of such
highly prejudicial information would warrant a mistrial or a reversal. Yet
for the defendant/witness, even an objection to such a question is itself
damning. Few prosecutors will object, for they recognize that too many
objections will cause the jury to think that something is being hidden. If
the availability of inadmissible information of this kind were limited, the
defendant/witness would no longer be denied fundamental due process.
It may be argued that any form of privilege violates the male defend-
129. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103. In Maryland, a pros-
ecuting attorney is also under a continuing legal obligation to disclose relevant evidence of
which a party has requested discovery. See MD. R. P. 741(f).
130. A similar production of witness' statements is already practiced in federal courts
under 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1976).
131. See Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 175 A.2d 777 (1961); ef. Shartzer v. State, 63
Md. 149, 52 Am. Rep. 501 (1885).
132. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE. ANN. § 3-828 (Cum. Supp. 1977); but see Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
133. See Rau v. State, 133 Md. 613, 616, 105 A. 867, 868 (1919).
134. At a hearing before the Maryland Special Committee on Rape and Related. Of-
fenses, Sept. 29, 1975, Annapolis, Maryland, a state legislator who was also a defense attor-
ney stated that he had introduced a bill requiring an in camera hearing to rule on the
admissibility of certain kinds of evidence in a rape trial "to protect rape victims from
myself" (authors' recollection). See H. Bill No. 1092, 1975 Sess., Md. Gen. Ass. As a defense
attorney he apparently felt compelled to get in inadmissible evidence in any way possible.
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ant's right to due process. 135 There has, however, been no clear statement
that the Constitution requires the prosecutor to disclose voluntarily to the
defense any and all information relative to the offense. 136 The closer ques-
tion concerns discovery, not disclosure. If the defense, suspecting or know-
ing of the existence of certain information, demands it from the prosecutor,
can the privilege as proposed withstand constitutional scrutiny? Through
the creation of a procedure whereby the disclosure decision, if contested by
the prosecutor, is decided by the judge, the authors believe it can. 137 Such
a procedure would require the defense attorney to justify his or her de-
mands. As long as there has been a pretrial finding that the information
sought through discovery is not material to guilt or punishment, it should
remain privileged.
138
A second way to encourage the development of an attorney-client rela-
tionship between the defendant/witness and the prosecutor is to establish a
sex offense unit within the prosecutor's office. 139 Currently, most big city
prosecutor's offices are organized on an assembly line basis. 14° One unit
specializes in receiving complaints, another in formulating indictments,
and a third in litigation. Since the defendant/witness rarely deals with the
same attorney at each stage of the proceeding, and the internal communi-
cation between these units is often limited, it is unlikely that she ever de-
velops the requisite relationship of trust and confidence with anyone. The
establishment of a sex offense unit would address this problem.
Instead of being organized on the basis of tasks, the sex offense unit
would handle every sex crime from start to finish. 141 Members of this unit,
135. "The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth
emerges .... No respectable interest of the State is served by its concealment of informa-
tion which is material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defenses."
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
136. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
137. See, e.g., Maryland procedure for discovery of juvenile court record, MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-828 (Cum. Supp. 1977); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. But see Green v.
State, 25 Md. App. 679, 700-01, 337 A.2d 729, 741 (1975).
138. For a discussion of the conflicting rights of the defendant and the prosecutrix in the
context of rape shield statutes, see Berger, supra note 41, at 39-84.
139. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration recommends the establishment of
this kind of unit. See LEAA, RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS, HEALTH
FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES (1975).
140. See Abrams, Internal Policy. Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Complaint Bureau
Level, 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 81 (1975).
141. The Federal judiciary has adopted a similar system in moving from the master cal-
endar to the individual assignment calendar, a fact which pleases Chief Justice Burger be-
cause of the increased efficiency it has brought. See TIME, April 19, 1976, at 89.
A similar change has also occurred within the New York City Legal Aid Society. U.S.
District Judge Orrin Judd criticized the office for assigning attorneys to handle only certain
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on call twenty-four hours a day, would meet each defendant/witness at the
hospital, take her initial statement, ascertain immediately that all neces-
sary and available evidence had been taken from her and from the scene,
appear at line-ups, preliminary hearings, and grand juries, charge the sus-
pect, and prosecute the case in court. Each team member would follow
through, so that at least one person would always know the status of a
particular case. The defendant/witness would only have to repeat her story
once. There would be a specific person with whom she could meet and
grow to trust. There would be a chance, impossible under the present as-
sembly line approach, for an honest rapport to develop between prosecutor
and defendant/witness. And with one attorney on the case from its incep-
tion, particularly one who had observed the immediate impact of the at-
tack on the defendant/witness, there would be less chance that a case
would be lost in the system. Most importantly, there would be a greater
likelihood that the defendant/witness would be given a good defense.
Despite the possible improvements in the prosecutor's handling of rape
cases the role of the prosecutor vis-a-vis the defendant/witness remains
somewhat circumscribed. According to our jurisprudence, the prosecuting
attorney's true client is the government,142 and it is the government's inter-
ests which the prosecutor represents. 43 But those interests are not neces-
sarily the same as those of the defendant/witness. 144 The government is
primarily interested in convicting the guilty, at whatever personal and
emotional costs. The defendant/witness wants her attacker convicted and
an acquittal for herself on charges of consenting; in addition, and, perhaps
primarily, she wants to survive the trial relatively unscathed.
The high personal costs to the defendant/witness involved in convicting
the rapist, even if recognized by the prosecutor, may not be as influential a
factor to the attorney for the state as they would be to a private attorney
for the defendant/witness. For example, the defendant/witness could have
been raped by an armed assailant. If the attacker were tried only for the
handgun violations and not for the rape, the defendant/witness would not
simultaneously be on trial for her alleged consensual intercourse. As attor-
ney for the state, the prosecutor would be reluctant to drop the rape
facts of this case rather than to handle individual cases in their entirety, a budget-saving
device, which, in his opinion, hampered the development of the attorney-client relationship.
The practice is now changing. Rosebaum, I Don't Want No Public Defender, I Want A Real
Lawyer, JURIS DOCTOR, October, 1975, at 43.
142. 2 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 482, 487 (1831).
143. See MD. CONST., art. 5, § 9; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 10, § 34 (1957).
144. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 840 (1975) (situation of the rape victim vis-a-vis the
prosecutor is analogized to other court situations.)
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charges, but as attorney for the the defendant/witness, the prosecutor
might urge her to accept the proposal. It is unlikely that the prosecutor
could or would propose such a suggestion to the defendant/witness. Be-
cause of the difficulties inherent in assigning the prosecutor two clients in
the same trial, situations are limited in which it is feasible for the prosecu-
tor to provide the defendant/witness with adequate counsel.
One approach to this problem would be to utilize private attorneys to
prosecute rape cases. Women's groups have long suggested that a rape vic-
tim hire an attorney to accompany her to trial, 145 but the private prosecu-
tor would be far more than a companion. Depending on the requirements
of a particular case, a private prosecutor could merely supplement the
work of the public prosecutor's office, or, if necessary, assume control of
the case. In such a situation, after examining the evidence, the private
prosecutor would decide whether or not to prosecute, charge the suspect,
and conduct the trial. Chosen for a particular case, a private prosecutor
would more likely be free of the prejudices which prevent the initiation of
many prosecutions and would have more reason to pursue that case with
diligence. Whether the private prosecutor is chosen initially by the defend-
ant/witness to augment an overworked prosecutor's office or hired only
after the state has refused to prosecute, this attorney, by the circumstances
of his or her employment, would be far more committed to the best inter-
ests of the victim. Although the state would ultimately pay for the attorney,
since the prosecution would be in the name of the state, the defend-
ant/witness would have a greater voice in the management of the case.
Since the relationship between the two would more closely resemble the
traditional model of the attorney-client relationship, the privilege pro-
posed earlier would be less difficult to establish. The entire journey
through the legal system would be less traumatic for the defendant/witness
were she accompanied by her own private attorney acting in the state's
name.
The concept of a private prosecutor is an old one. Common law pro-
vided an independent action, called an appeal, which Blackstone defined
as an "accusation by a private subject against another, for some heinous
crime, demanding punishment on account of the particular injury suffered
rather than for the offence against the public."1 6 Rape was one of the
felonies for which an appeal would lie. The appeal was neither wholly
public nor wholly private: an acquittal precluded the king from initiating
prosecution, but a guilty verdict would not be pardoned by the king since
145. See, e.g., WOMEN ORGANIZED AGAINST RAPE, HANDBOOK: MEDICAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF RAPE 7 (1973).
146. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES $312.
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the action was "at the suit of a private subject, to make an atonement for
the private wrong." 47 Highlighting the defendant status of the rape victim
(and of victims of other crimes who undertook to employ this method) was
the provision for imprisoning and fining the appellant if the appellee was
acquitted.
148
The development of a private prosecutor system has been recommended
in the United States,' 49 primarily to combat prosecutorial inaction caused
by political pressures or an insufficient staff. It has been suggested that "[a]
trial court may in its discretion, upon petition of any person, substitute an
attorney hired by the petitioner to replace a public prosecutor for any
criminal prosecution if (a) the public prosecutor fails or refuses to prose-
cute the defendant or proceeds improperly, and (b) the crime charged is
open and notorious or the petitioner has a cause of action against the de-
fendant in tort on the facts alleged."' 50 Funds for paying the prosecutor
would come from public monies; yet if the court determined that the pros-
ecution was a malicious one, it could hold the petitioner liable for compen-
sating the prosecutor and for court costs.
Although the idea may sound novel, private prosecutors have, in fact,
been employed in certain circumstances in a majority of states.' 5' An 1878
Maryland case reveals the use of private prosecutors, 52 and recent cases
indicate that the practice has not abated.153 In a questionnaire distributed
to public prosecutors in forty-five states, sixty-two percent of the respon-
dents stated that they permitted the hiring of private attorneys to aid in
criminal trial presentations. 54 It is a method, however, which is not widely
known. In an ironic twist, the family of Clarence Alligood, the jailer,
whom Joan Little killed when he tried to rape her, hired a private prosecu-
tor to aid the state in its prosecution. 55 Ohio, having recently revised its
rape laws, 156 now provides free legal services to indigent rape victims to
aid them in proceedings regarding admissibility of evidence. The original
version of the Ohio bill provided for mandatory appointment of counsel.
147. Id. at 316.
148. Id.
149. Comment, Private Prosecution.- A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted
Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
150. Id. at 233.
151. Id. at 218-22.
152. See State v. Carter, 49 Md. 8 (1878).
153. See Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 A. 45 (1933); State v. Aquilla, 18 Md. App.
487, 309 A.2d 44 (1973).
154. See Comment, supra note 148, at 219.
155. See Baltimore Evening Sun, July 22, 1975, § A, at 2, col. 7.
156. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(0, 2907.05(0 (Page Supp. 1977).
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Even as enacted, however, it stands as a unique and innovative provi-
sion. 157
Nevertheless, certain refinements of the general private prosecutor con-
cept are needed. 58 It would have to be resolved whether the action would
supplement the public action, as described by Blackstone, or would simply
replace the public action, as is the current practice. If primarily private, the
question of who would pay the prosecutor could be troublesome; if prima-
rily public, many of the same conflicts between the interests of the state
and those of the defendant/witness might continue. A middle ground
might be a scheme in which the prosecutor and the defendant/witness'
attorney both participate. The privilege between the defendant/witness
and her own attorney could be more readily preserved and the cost of the
additional attorney would not be as high as it might be if a private attorney
were the sole prosecutor. This scheme does present. some problems. The
most apparent ones are those involving the distribution of power between
the prosecutor and the defendant/witness' attorney in the decisionmaking
process, such as which attorney would decide whether to go to trial and
how to actually handle the case. The problems are not, however, insur-
mountable. If consent remains an element of the crime of rape, efforts
must be made to afford the defendant/witness due process. These sugges-
tions-recognition of the prosecutor as defense attorney, private prosecu-
tion, and dual prosecution--qualified as they all might be, would represent
the beginnings of a new treatment of the defendant/witness in the criminal
justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
For 4000 years, from the Code of Hammurabi to the present day, the
law of rape has remained essentially the same. The basic elements of the
157. See Comment, Ohio's New Rape Law: Does It Protect Complainant .4t the Expense
ofthe Rights ofthe.Accused, 9 AKRON L. REV. 337, 342 n.35 (1975). It was in Ohio that a
woman recently filed suit against her assailant and was awarded $22,000 in damages. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1977, § 1, at 18, col. 1. As part of the law dealing with reparation awards to
victims of crime, a rape victim, among others, is given the explicit right to "sue the offender
for any damages or injuries caused by the offender's criminally injurious conduct ... 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.72 (Page Supp. 1977).
A woman can pursue a civil claim against her assailant without benefit of specific laws
such as Ohio's. A Maryland woman recently sought to recover $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages from her assailant, who had pled guilty to sec-
ond-degree sexual assault. In addition, the woman sued the attacker's parents on the
grounds of negligent entrustment; they had left their son in charge of the family-owned bar,
where the attack occurred, while they were on vacation. Beardsworth v. Fields, No. 97201
(Balt. County, Md. Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 27, 1977).
158. For a discussion of the negative aspects of the employment of private prosecutors in
rape cases, see Berger, supra note 41.
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crime have not changed in the least. However great the force employed by
the male assailant, the attacked woman's freedom from guilt must be sepa-
rately established before her assailant is convicted. Since the law charges
the rape victim with the crime of consent, her status is actually that of a
defendant rather than that of a traditional victim. The treatment she re-
ceives coincides with her defendant status: emergency room doctors be-
grudgingly take the necessary medical evidence; police officers concentrate
more on discovering the likelihood of her having consented than on appre-
hending the male attacker; prosecutors resist proceeding to trial, and when
they do, they are limited in their ability to protect her from attacks by the
defense attorney; judge and jury remain skeptical of the victim's credibility
and are more than likely to blame the woman for encouraging the attack.
If the element of consent is to be retained in the law, the woman must
have the protections consonant with defendant status. First, her communi-
cations with the prosecutor must be privileged, for the prosecutor acts as
her attorney in defending her of the crime with which she is charged. Sec-
ond, prosecutors' offices must be reorganized to assure the woman of more
adequate representation. Finally, a system of private prosecution should
be developed to supplement or substitute state prosecution when the inter-
ests of the woman and the state conflict.
These three reforms have been presented not only to provide substantial
protection for the woman as defendant but also to make the reader sensi-
tive to the far-reaching ramifications of a woman's position as a defendant,
as well as the complexities of the reforms required to protect her ade-
quately. Despite the complexities, the protection of a woman's status as a
defendant can be accomplished within the system through a rearticulation
of our existing system of values. The danger of implementing these re-
forms, however, is that they perpetuate the status quo, for the woman is
still regarded as a possession and still bears the burden of guardianship.
Indeed, none of the reforms would be necessary if the definition of rape
were changed by eliminating the element of consent. If the law were re-
structured in this manner, the woman would no longer be charged with the
crime of consent and would cease to be a defendant. The simplicity of this
method of proceeding is attractive. Yet even if the element of consent is
abolished, the success of this change depends ultimately upon a change in
the way society views women. As long as women continue to be valued as
possessions, a law which by its terms does not treat women as possessions
will be circumvented. Nevertheless, the importance of the issue is such
that, despite the risks, legal reform is a crucial first step in the implementa-
tion of societal reform.
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